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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ZIONS 
a Utah 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK. ) 
corporation. ) 
Plaintiff/Respondent. ) 
vs. ) 
CLARK 
a Utah 
CLINIC CORPORATION. ) 
corporation. ) 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
Case No. 20105 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by Zions First National Bank 
(hereinafter called Zions) against Clark Clinic Corporation 
(hereinafter called Clark) to collect on a promissory note 
executed by the business manager of appellant. Clark, using 
facsimile signature stamps of the officers of Clark. Clark 
counterclaimed against Zions to recover funds it alleged were 
paid through the account from Clark's checking account on 
stamped facsimile signatures and checks cashed on alleged 
unauthorized endorsements. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court on September 30. 1982. granted 
Summary Judgment for respondent, dismissing Clark's Counter-
claim. On April 17. 1984. the Court granted Summary Judgment 
for respondent. Zions Bank, on its first cause of action on 
the promissory note in the principal sum of $25,000.00. The 
Court requested the issues of the computation of interest due 
under the note and the amount of attorney's fees be reserved 
for trial. (R. at 347-349). In June. 1984. the Court took 
evidence on the amount of attorney's fees for collecting of 
the note and the amount of interest due and rendered its 
judgment on July 6. 1984 in the amount of $25,000.00 princi-
pal. $27,332.31 interest accrued through May 31. 1984 and 
attorney's fees of $6,875.75. (R. at 357-360) Clark's appeal 
is taken from these decisions. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the Supreme Court reverse the 
judgment granted by the Court as a matter of law and judgment 
in its favor. Alternatively, appellant asks that the case be 
remanded to the district court for a trial on all issues. 
Respondent seeks to have the Supreme Court affirm the district 
court's award of judgment against appellant. Clark Clinic 
Corporation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts essential to the consideration of this 
appeal are set forth herein. 
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Prior to 1971. the Clark Clinic had been a partner-
ship of doctors. (R. 388; Deposition of Robert N. Westover 
5:1-12). 
Robert N. Westover had been the business manager of 
the partnership since 1960 (R. 41. 42; Defendant's Answers to 
Interrogatories #1. 2 and 3). The business was incorporated 
in about 1971. Mr. Westover continued as business manager for 
both the partnership and the corporation. (R. 388. Deposition 
of Robert N. Westover; 6:1-5. 17-17; Defendants Answers to 
Request for Admission #2; R. 48). 
As business manager. Mr. Westover kept the accounting 
and financial books of Clark, prepared checks for payment of 
accounts payable or in furtherance of the business of Clark, 
deposited funds to bank accounts, reconciled bank statements, 
received payment on accounts, did the general banking of 
Clark, made purchases of supplies, and did all the banking for 
Clark Cinic. a partnership. (R. 48. 49; Defendant's Answers 
to Request for Admission #3). 
In addition to being business manager for Clark. Mr. 
Westover also arranged personal loans for the doctors with 
banks. (R. 388; Deposition of Robert N. Westover 9:1-25). 
In 1976 Clark's business manager began using stamped 
fascimile signatures on various documents, including checks 
drawn by the manager for Clark's payment of accounts. (R. 
388; Deposition of Robert N. Westover 12:2-16). 
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The use of the stamped signatures continued until the 
business manager was terminated in September, 1978. 
Defendant's officers received checks payable to 
themselves bearing stamped facsimile signatures as early as 
January 5. 1978 (R. ; Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" attached 
to Requests for Admission). 
Clark received regular monthly statements from Zions 
with the cancelled checks bearing the stamped facsimilie 
signatures on them through September. 1978. (Defendant's 
Answers to Requests for Admission #4 & #5; R. 49-50). 
Clark did not notify Zions of the alleged unauthor-
ized signatures until after September 18. 1978. (R. 44; 
Defendant's Answer to Interrogatory No. 12). 
In August. 1978 there was a substantial overdraft in 
Clark's bank account. The business manager arranged a loan 
with Zions to cover the overdrafts. (R. 388; Deposition of 
Westover 20:16-25) 
The promissory note was signed with facsimilie signa-
tures by the business manager and returned to Zions. 
The loan funds were deposited in Clark's account to 
cover the overdrafts in August. 1978. (R. 383. Deposition of 
Arnold Brown 14:16-25). 
Clark made no payment on the promissory note and this 
action was commenced for collection of the note. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED APPELLANT'S 
COUNTERCLAIM WHICH CLAIMED ZIONS WAS LIABLE FOR 
HONORING CHECKS ON APPELLANT'S ACCOUNT WITH ALLEGED 
UNAUTHORIZED SIGNATURES 
The trial court granted Zions' Motion for Summary 
Judgment dismissing appellant's Counterclaim, finding that no 
issues of material fact remained precluding summary judgment 
and Zions was entitled to dismissal of the Counterclaim as a 
matter of law. The trial court's decision was based on the 
applicable sections of the Uniform Commercial Code, the Uni-
form Fiduciaries Act and Suqarhouse Finance Company v. Zions 
First National Bank. 21 Utah 2d 68. 440 P.2d 869 (1968). 
A. The Use Of Stamped Facsimile Signatures To 
Validate Checks Is Within The Contemplation 
Of The Uniform Commercial Code. 
Appellant counterclaimed in this action claiming that 
332 checks on its account honored by Zions between April. 1977 
and September. 1978. bore stamped facsimile signatures as one 
or both of the required signatures necessary to validate a 
check. Appellant claimed the use of the facsimile signatures 
on the checks was unauthorized and Zions should not have 
honored the checks. (R. at 18-20) Appellant has never al-
leged that the checks were used for anything other than the 
benefit of appellant. In fact. Zions propounded Requests for 
Admissions requesting appellant to admit or deny that each of 
the checks was used for payment of a debt of the Clark Clinic 
Corporation, the purchase of goods or services for the Clark 
Clinic Corporation or its principals, or was issued in fur-
therance of the business of the Clark Clinic Corporation. 
Appellant in February. 1981. merely answered that it needed 
more information which it had not developed yet. (Answer to 
Requests for Admission #1.B. R. at 47. 48.) Appellant never 
supplemented the answer even though the information to answer 
the Request is peculiarly within the control of appellant. 
The starting point for determining the issue of 
whether Zions is liable for accepting the alleged unauthorized 
signatures is §70A~3-307. Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 
which provides in pertinent part: 
(1) . . . when the effectiveness of a 
signature is put in issue 
(a) the burden of establishing it is 
on the party claiming under the signa-
tures; but 
(b) the signature is presumed to be 
genuine or authorized. (Emphasis added) 
The introduction of the checks bearing the signatures 
of the officers of appellant made out a prima facia case and 
shifted the burden of establishing the lack of authority to 
appellant. See Taeqer & Branch. Inc. v. Pappas. 20 Utah 2d 
100. 433 P.2d 605 (1969). And in §70A-3-401 (2) . Utah Code 
Annotated, as amended, it provides that: 
A signature is made by use of any name, 
including any trade or assumed name, upon 
an instrument, or by any word or mark used 
in lieu of a written signature. (Emphasis 
added) 
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Therefore, unless appellant carries its burden of 
establishing the lack of authority the signature, including 
any mark used in lieu of a written signature, is presumed to 
be genuine and authorized. 
Appellant cites the Court to three cases from other 
jurisdictions which it claims hold that the unauthorized use 
of a rubber stamp signature is not a valid signature. The 
first case appellant cites is Robb v. Pennsylvania Co. For 
Insurance, Etc. A. 969, 186 Pa. St. 456 (1898) In Robb the 
employee was not authorized to use the rubber stamp in any way 
and had to break into the employers safe to use the stamp. 
The Court found the use of the stamp was unlawful and the 
employer had not entrusted the stamp to his employee. But, 
the Court went on to say that if the owner of the stamp: 
If the owner place it in the hands of a 
third person for the purpose of affixing 
the signature to certain papers, and he, 
without authority, use it to forge the 
signature of the owner to checks, it might 
well be argued that the bank honoring the 
checks should not be responsible for the 
loss. . . . the loss would be traceable to 
the act of the owner of the stamp in 
selection of the agent to use it. 
Robb at 969. 
The uncontroverted facts of this case are that Robert 
N. Westover had the use of the facsimile signature stamp at 
least to affix the signature of the doctors onto insurance 
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forms. (Deposition of Robert N. Westover, page 54, lines 
14-25.) 
The second case cited by appellant is Seattle-First 
National Bank v. Pacific National Bank. 587 P.2d 617, 22 Wash. 
App. 47 (1978). In that case, the issue was not the liability 
of the bank for honoring a check signed by use of a rubber 
stamp; rather, the issue was whether a collecting bank was 
liable to a payor bank on the theory of breach of warranty of 
good title for honoring a check payable to a corporate entity 
endorsed by stamping "for deposit only" to the account of an 
individual. The issue before this Court, of the use of a 
stamp facsimile signature to validate a check, was never 
addressed by the Washington court. 
The third case cited by appellant, Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co. v. Hepler State Bank, 630 P.2d 721 (Kan.App.. 1981). 
involved an employee who used a stamp of the name of his 
corporate employer and not a facsimile signature to fill in 
the payee and endorsed the check with the same stamp. He then 
endorsed them to himself for deposit in his personal account. 
The facts are significantly different from the present case. 
Appellant has cited no cases holding that a check 
signed by an agent affixing the signature of his principal by 
using a facsimile signature stamp in excess of his authority 
renders the instrument invalid. If the Court held as urged by 
appellant it would create a horrendous burden on banks to 
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verify the validity of signatures and who affixed the signa-
ture on the check that was not contemplated by the legislature 
in passing the Uniform Commercial Code. 
B. Even If The Use Of The Facsimile Signature 
Stamp Was Unauthorized, Appellant Is Barred 
From Asserting The Signatures Were Un-
authorized. 
Regardless of whether the use of the facsimile signa-
ture stamps was authorized, appellant is precluded from as-
serting against Zions the lack of authority. The preclusion 
is in §70A-4-406. Utah Code Annotated, as amended, which 
(1) When a bank sends to its customer a 
statement of account accompanied by items 
paid in good faith in support of the debit 
entries. . .. the customer must exercise 
reasonable care and promptness to examine 
the statement and items to discover his 
unauthorized signature or any alteration on 
an item and must notify the bank promptly 
after discovery thereof. 
(2) If the bank establishes that the 
customer failed with respect to an item to 
comply with the duties imposed by subsec-
tion (1) the customer is precluded from 
asserting against the bank 
(a) his unauthorized signature or any 
alteration on the item if the bank also 
establishes that it suffered a loss by 
reason of such failure; and 
(b) an unauthorized signature or 
alteration by the same wrongdoer on any 
other item paid in good faith by the 
bank after the first item and statement 
was available to the customer for a 
reasonable period not exceeding four-
teen calendar days and before the bank 
receives notification from the customer 
of any such unauthorized signature or 
alteration. (Emphasis added) 
_ Q _ 
The undisputed facts before the Court are that the 
monthly statements of account and returned checks were regu-
larly received by appellant at Claris place of business for 
the period of time when the checks with the alleged unauthor-
ized signatures were processed through appellants account, a 
period of 17 months. (Answer to Requests for Admission #4 and 
#5. R. at 49, 50.) Appellant made no claim to Zions of the 
alleged unauthorized signatures until after September 21. 
1978. (R. at 18). The checks bearing the alleged unauthor-
ized signatures fo; which plaintiff counterclaimed were paid 
between April. 1977 and September. 1978. 
Appellant is barred by §70A-4-406(2)(o) i^.m assert-
ing any alleged unauthorized signatures by reason of its 
failure to notify Zions before it paid the checks of the 
alleged unauthorized signature from the time the statement 
containing the first unauthorized signature by its agent was 
received by appellant. 
Section 70A-4-406 further provides that: 
(3) The preclusion under subsection (2) 
does not apply if the customer establishes 
lack of ordinary care on the part of the 
bank in paying the item(s). (Emphasis 
added) 
The only evidence introduced by appellant in its 
opposition to Zions' Motion for Summary Judgment to show that 
Zions paid the items with lack of ordinary care is that the 
items contained stamped facsimile signatures. Appellant 
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contends this raises an issue of fact precluding summary 
judgment. But it is undisputed by either appellant or respon-
dent that one or both of the signatures on the checks com-
plained of were stamped facsimile signatures, the facts are 
not in dispute. The trial court merely found that stamped 
facsimile signatures were recognized under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code and absent other evidence of lack of ordinary 
care it ruled as a matter of law that Zions did not lack due 
care in paying the checks. (R. at 94). 
C. Appellant Ratified The Use Of The Stamped 
Facsimilee Signatures. 
Even if the use of stamped facsimile signatures by 
Robert N. Westover, Claris business manager, was unauthor-
ized, appellant, through its officers, knew of the use of the 
stamps and ratified their use. Appellant in its Counterclaim 
and in subsequent Affidavits by appellant's officers claims it 
did not learn of the alleged unauthorized signatures until 
September. 1978. but the evidence before the trial court shows 
that the officers of appellant did in fact know of the stamped 
signatures at the time they were being affixed to checks. Of 
the 332 checks furnished to Zions by appellant as the checks 
bearing unauthorized stamped signatures which were attached to 
Zions Interrogatories and Requests for Admission to appellant, 
six of the checks were paid to officers of the corporation 
which they subsequently cashed or deposited to their personal 
accounts. Those checks show the following: 
Check 
No. 
Date Payee Amount Manual 
Signature 
Stamped 
Signature 
Page No, Re< 
of Ex A Pi 
to Req. N< 
for Adm. 
2850 
2851 
2852 
3341 
3342 
3404 
1/5/78 
1/5/78 
1/5/78 
4/25/78 
4/25/78 
4/7/78 
Richard S. Clark 
R. Craifc Clark 
Stanley N. Clark 
Richard S. Clark 
Richard S. Clark 
Richard S. Clark 
$4,000.00 
$6,000.00 
$6,000.00 
$ 384.87 
$1,000.00 
$5,000.00 
R. 
R. 
R. 
CraiR 
Craifc 
Craig; 
None 
None 
None 
Clark 
Clark 
Clark 
Stanley N. Clark 
Stanley Clark 
Stanley N. Clark 
R. Craig Clark 
Stanley N. Clark 
R. Craig Clark 
Stanley N. Clark 
Stanley N. Clark 
R, Craig Clark 
29 
30 
31 
220 
221 
249 
Richard S. Clark is president of Clark Clinic Cor-
poration, Stanley N. Clark is past vice-president and R. Craig 
Clark is secretary/treasurer. (R. at 285. 289. 293). 
Even though appellant claims it did not receive 
notice of the use of stamped signatures on its checks until 
September. 1978. the record established that reasonable minds 
could not differ that appellant's officers knew of the use of 
stamped signatures. 
Section 70A-3-404. Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 
provides that: 
(1) Any unauthorized signature is wholly 
inoperative as that of the person whose 
name is signed unless he ratifies it or is 
precluded from denying it, . . 
(2) Any unauthorized signature may be 
ratified for all purposes of this chapter. 
. . . (Emphasis added) 
Therefore. the stamped facsimile signatures are 
capable of ratification. 
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In Bradshaw v. McBride. 649 P.2d 74 (Utah, 1982), 
this Court gave a detailed discussion of the principles of 
ratification. Therein, the Court held that ratification need 
not be an express ratification. 
A principal may impliedly or expressly 
ratify an agreement made by an unauthorized 
agent. . . . Under some circumstances 
failure to disaffirm may constitute rati-
fication of the agent's act. . . . "Any 
conduct which indicates assent by the 
purported principal to become a party to 
the transaction or which is justifiable 
only if there is ratification is suffi-
cient. Even silence with full knowledge of 
the facts may manifest affirmance and thus 
operate as a ratification." (quoting Moses 
v. McFarland & Son. 119 Utah 602. 607, 230 
P.2d 571. 573-74) 
Bradshaw at 78. 
Appellant ratified the use of the stamped facsimile 
signatures when its officers accepted checks bearing those 
signatures. Furthermore, the ratification established a 
course of conduct between Zions and appellant for the accep-
tance of stamped facsimile signatures. While the course of 
dealing established between Zions and appellant for the use of 
stamped facsimile signatures may not be sufficient justifica-
tion at law to hold that appellant ratified the use of stamped 
facsimile signatures on all checks, the equities in this case 
cry out that appellant should be estopped from asserting the 
use of the facsimile signature stamps was unauthorized. 
Appellant!s officers accepted checks bearing stamped signa-
tures, it allowed its business manager. Robert N. Westover. to 
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use and have access to the stamp, and it waited until Zions 
attempted to collect its promissory note to assert the un-
authorized signature. 
Neither is it a defense that appellant did not have 
full knowledge of the use of the facsimile signature stamp-
In Moses v. Archie McFarland & Son, and again in Bradshaw 
cited above, this Court held that failure to look at informa-
tion within a principal's possession would not prevent rati-
fication. 
So a purported principal may not be wil-
fully ignorant, nor may he purposely shut 
his eyes to means of information within his 
possession and control and thereby escape 
ratification if the circumstances are such 
that he could reasonably have been expected 
to dissent unless he were willing to be a 
party to the transaction. 
Bradshaw. 64 9 P.2d at 7 8 
All such checks bearing the stamped signatures were 
returned to Clark monthly with the monthly statement. (R. 
49-50; Defendant's Answers to Requests for Admission #4 and #5) 
Appellant's failure to avail itself of information 
within its possession and control is of signal importance in 
this case since appellant was under a duty imposed by 
§70A-4-406. Utah Code Annotated, as amended, to examine the 
statements sent to it by Zions and notify Zions promptly of 
any unauthorized signatures. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal 
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of appellants counterclaim alleging the unauthorized signa-
ture on its checks. 
D. Sugarhouse Finance Is Dispositive Of The 
Fourth Cause of Action of Appellants 
Counterclaim. 
Utah has adopted the Uniform Fiduciaries Act. Title 
22. Chapter 1. Utah Code Annotated, as amended. In 22-1-1. 
Utah Code Annotated, as amended, a fiduciary covered by the 
provisions of the act is defined as: 
••Fiduciary" includes a trustee under any 
trust. expressed. implied. resulting or 
constructive. executor. administrator, 
guardian. conservator. curator. receiver, 
trustee in bankruptcy. assignee for the 
benefit of creditors. partner. agent, 
officer of a corporation, public or pri-
vate, public officer, and any other person 
acting in a fiduciary capacity for any 
person, trust or estate. (Emphasis added) 
The purpose of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act is "to 
protect the bank where it allows withdrawals on the personal 
order of a fiduciary who may be breaching his trust, unless 
the latter fact is known to the bank." Movie Films. Inc. v. 
First Security Bank of Utah. N.A.. 447 P.2d 38. 22 Utah 2d 1 
at 4. Footnote 2 (1968). 
In answer to Requests for Admissions #3 (R. at 48. 
49). appellant admitted that Robert N. Westover was the busi-
ness manager of Clark Clinic Corporation and his duties in-
cluded keeping the accounting and financial books of the Clark 
Clinic Corporation; preparing and directing the preparation of 
checks for the payment of accounts payable of the Clark Clinic 
i d_ 
Corporation; making deposits of funds received by the Clark 
Clinic Corporation; doing the general banking for the Clark 
Clinic Corporation; since incorporation in 1971 he endorsed or 
directed the endorsement of all checks payable to Clark Clinic 
Corporation (although appellant contends the authority to 
endorse checks was limited to endorsing by stamp for deposit 
only); and he did substantially all the banking for the Clark 
Clinic, a partnership. 
It is clear when you look at the duties and responsi-
bilities of Robert N Westover that he comes under the defini-
tion of a fiduciary for purposes of the Uniform Fiduciary 
Act. He was the agent for both the Clark Clinic Corporation 
and Clark Clinic, a partnership. 
Section 22-1-2. Utah Code Annotated. as amended. 
provides that: 
A person, who in good faith pays or trans-
fers to a fiduciary any money or other 
property which the fiduciary as such is 
authorized to receive, is not responsible 
for the proper application thereof by the 
fiduciary; and no right or title acquired 
from the fiduciary in consideration of such 
payment or transfer is invalid in conse-
quence of a misapplication by the fiduciary. 
And in §22-1-4. Utah Code Annotated, as amended: 
. . . if any negotiable instrument payable 
or endorsed to his principal is endorsed by 
a fiduciary empowered to endorse such 
instrument on behalf of his principal, the 
endorsee is not bound to inquire whether 
the fiduciary is committing a breach of his 
obligation as fiduciary in endorsing or 
delivering the instrument. and is not 
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chargeable with notice that the fiduciary 
is committing a breach of his obligation as 
fiduciary, unless he takes the instrument 
with actual knowledge of such breach or 
with knowledge of such facts that his 
action in taking the instrument amounts to 
bad faith. 
Of the twelve checks claimed to have been endorsed 
and cashed without authority, eight of the checks, totalling 
$9,600.00. were made payable to Clark Clinic, a partnership 
and the remaining four checks, totalling $3,200.00. were made 
out to either cash or to Zions First National Bank. (R. at 
22-31). The Answers to Reguests for Admissions referred to 
above demonstrate that Robert N. Westover was empowered to 
endorse checks for both Clark Clinic, a partnership, and Clark 
Clinic Corporation. Appellant's claim that it limited the 
power of Robert N. Westover to endorse those checks is pre-
cisely the type of limitation that the Uniform Fiduciaries Act 
is designed to shield the bank from the obligation to inquire 
into before it can cash a check of a principal presented by or 
endorsed by the agent of the principal. 
In Sugarhouse Finance Company v. Zions First National 
Bank. 440 P.2d 869. 21 Utah 2d 68 (1968). the Court made a 
detailed analysis of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act and found 
that: 
. . . the statute places a duty on princi-
pals to use only honest fiduciaries, and 
gives relief to those who deal with fidu-
ciaries except where they know the fiduci-
ary is breaching his duty to his principal 
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or where they have knowledge of facts that 
their action in dealing with the fiduciary 
amounts to bad faith. 
Id. at 70. 
The Court went on to define "bad faith" as "when a 
thing is done dishonestly and not merely negligently." Sugar-
house at 70. Appellant has never alleged that Zions had 
actual knowledge that Westover was breaching a duty to the 
appellant or that Zions acted in bad faith. The Counterclaim 
merely alleges that Zions was negligent in cashing the 
checks. (R. at 22. 23) . 
The rulings in Sugarhouse have recently been re-
affirmed by this Court in Research-Planning. Inc. v. Bank of 
Utah. #18968. decided September 28. 1984. P.2d . 
In holding that the bank cannot be held liable unless there is 
a showing of "bad faith", this Court at page 4 said: "Thus, 
bad faith requires willfulness; simple negligent conduct by 
itself is not a sufficient basis for liability." 
The Court in Sugarhouse found that negligence was not 
a sufficient basis for a cause of action because of the limi-
tations imposed by the Uniform Fiduciaries Act. Furthermore, 
the Court held that: 
the plaintiff suffered no loss by 
reason of the cashing of the checks, for 
the funds from the checks were given to its 
fiduciary, who under his duty should have 
held them for the plaintiff. 
Sugarhouse at 70. 
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The holdings in Sugarhouse were made even though the 
fiduciary had deposited the funds to his personal account in 
the same bank. 
Appellant has no cause of action against Zions for 
cashing the checks presented to it by Robert N. Westover and 
delivering the money to him because Westover was under a duty 
to hold it for appellant. Any claim of appellant for those 
funds would properly lie against appellant's agent, Robert N. 
Westover. if he did not fulfill his duty to deliver the funds 
to appellant. 
E. Appellant Does Not Have Standing Interest 
To Bring Any Claim That Zions Cashed Checks 
Payable To Clark Clinic, A Partnership. On 
Unauthorized Endorsements. 
This action was commenced by Zions against Clark, for 
collection of a promissory note. Clark in turn counterclaimed 
against Zions because Zions honored alleged unauthorized 
endorsements and signatures of Clark's checks. Included in 
Clark's Fourth Cause of Action is a claim that eight checks 
payable to Clark Clinic, a partnership, totalling $9,600.00, 
for rent of Clark Clinic's office building were cashed by 
Zions on unauthorized endorsements. (R. at 22-31. appellant's 
brief at 3). 
Any claim that the endorsements by Robert N. West-
over were not authorized by Clark Clinic, a partnership, would 
necessarily have to be brought by Clark Clinic, a partner-
ship. Clark Clinic Corporation has suffered no injury by any 
alleged unauthorized endorsement by an agent of Clark Clinic. 
a partnership. 
POINT II 
THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION 
GRANTING ZIONS1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE GROUNDS THAT 
APPELLANT RATIFIED THE PROMISSORY NOTE 
Zions' First Cause of Action is for appellant's 
failure to pay a $25,000.00 promissory note when due. Appel-
lant contends the promissory note was entered into by its 
business manager. Robert N. Westover, and he executed it by 
affixing facsimile signature stamps of the officers1 signatures 
to the note without authority. Appellant claims Westover did 
not have either express, apparent or implied authority to 
borrow money on behalf of appellant. (Appellant's Point 3 A. 
and 3 B.). 
Regardless of whether Westover had authority to 
borrow money from Zions on behalf of appellant, appellant has 
ratified the promissory note entered into by Westover. Since 
the ruling of the trial court was predicated upon the defen-
dant's ratification, the issue of apparent or implied author-
ity is immaterial and irrelevant to this appeal. 
It is clear that a principal can either expressly or 
impliedly ratify the transaction of an unauthorized agent. 
Bradshaw v. McBride. 649 P.2d 74 (Utah. 1982); Moses v. Archie 
McFarland & Son. 119 Utah 2d 602. 230 P.2d 571 (1951). And as 
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cited above in Point I in both Bradshaw and Moses, the Court 
held: 
Any conduct which indicates assent by the 
purported principal to become a party to 
the transaction or which is justifiable 
only if there is ratification is sufficient. 
Bradshaw at 78. 
Utah recognized early on that a principal may not 
retain the benefits of a contract entered into by an alleged 
unauthorized agent and still repudiate the contract. In Floor 
v. Mitchell. 86 Utah 203. 41 P.2d 281 (1935). the Court held: 
When a principal claims the benefits of a 
contract made by his agent. he cannot 
repudiate the acts of his agent on the 
ground such acts were unauthorized. Ac-
cepting a contract and claiming the fruits 
thereof, the principal takes with whatever 
taint attaches to its origin. 
Id. at 287. 
The undisputed affidavit of Arnold W. Brown, branch 
manager of Zions First National Bank's Provo Regional Head 
Office, states that the $25,000.00 proceeds of the promissory 
note were deposited to appellant's checking account on August 
19 and August 30. 1978. (R. at 241). By appellant's own 
representations, it learned of the promissory note no later 
than September. 1978. (R. at 284). Appellant has never 
returned the proceeds of the promissory notes. (R. at 242). 
The retention of the loan proceeds by appellant 
precludes it from asserting that the acts of its business 
manager in entering into the transaction exceeded his author-
ity. 
A. Ratification Of The Promissory Note Does 
Not Require A Corporate Resolution. 
Appellant cites various cases from other jurisdic-
tions which it contends hold that ratification of a loan 
entered into by an unauthorized agent must be in writing. The 
cases do not so hold and in fact support Zions claim that 
appellant has ratified the promissory note herein. 
In Calhoun v. McCrory Piano & Realty Co., 129 Tenn. 
651t 168 S.WL 149. cited by appellant, the Court stated the 
general rule of retention of benefits constituting ratifica-
tion: 
it is a well-settled doctrine of equity 
that where a principal obtains the benefit 
of a loan procured by his agent acting 
without authority, he thereby ratifies the 
unauthorized contract, and makes himself 
liable to the lender for the sum received. 
Id. at 150. 
In Calhoun, the only reason the Court found there was 
no ratification was because the loan proceeds were deposited 
to the agent's personal account and then the agent used the 
proceeds to pay an obligation he owed to his principal. The 
principal did not receive the benefit of loan because it did 
not "increase his money in hand, or which he is entitled to 
receive from his agent, or unless it is used to extinguish 
outstanding liabilities against him." Calhoun at 150. In the 
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case now at bar. appellant received the benefit of the loan 
because it was deposited to Clark's account reducing an out-
standing obligation, namely the overdraft of its account. 
Duffy V. Scott. 129 ALR 487. 235 Wis. 142. 292 NW 
273. cited by appellant, was an action for money had and 
received and did not address whether an action would lie on 
the underlying contractual terras of the promissory note. 
Appellant cites 114 ALR 996 as authority for the 
proposition that ratification of the loan must be by corporate 
resolution. The annotation deals with ratification of the 
sale of land and the case therein holds that since the con-
tract for the sale of land is required by the statute of 
frauds to be in writing, the ratification of the sale must 
also be in writing. 
This writer has been unable to find any cases requir-
ing ratification to be in writing other than those dealing 
with transactions covered by the statute of frauds. Further-
more, the claim of appellant that it can only borrow under 
authority of a corporate resolution is inaccurate. Section 
16-10~4(h). Utah Code Annotated. as amended. specifically 
grants a corporation the power to borrow money. At common 
law. if the officers or agents of a corporation borrowed money 
without a corporate resolution, one of the defenses available 
to the corporation was that the act was invalid as to the 
corporation under the doctrine of ultra vires acts. But Utah 
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has abolished that defense except for limited situations, 
namely some actions by shareholders against the corporation or 
actions by the corporation against its officers. Section 
16-10-6. Utah Code Annotated, as amended. 
The cases cited above in this memorandum dealing with 
ratification by retention of benefits include cases of rati-
fication by corporations. In Antrim Lumber Co. v. Oklahoma 
State Bank. 65 Okla. 25. 162 P. 723 (1917). the facts before 
the Oklahoma Court were nearly identical to the present case. 
The defendant. Antrim Lumber Co.'s agent "was without author-
ity to borrow money. . . or to sign the name of defendant." 
Id. at 724. The agent signed a promissory note on behalf of 
the defendant to cover an overdraft in the defendant's check-
ing account allegedly created by the agent's embezzlement. 
The Court cited authorities from numerous jurisdictions in 
support of its holding that the credit to the defendant's 
account to cover the overdraft conferred a benefit upon the 
defendant. Defendant Antrim Lumber Co.'s failure to return 
those funds constituted a ratification of the unauthorized act 
of its agent. 
Therefore, appellant's claim that the only means of 
ratifying the loan from Zions is by corporate resolution is 
not supported by either statutory or case law. 
B. Appellant Cannot Avoid Ratification By 
Claiming It Did not Have The Money To Repay 
Zions. 
Appellant claims there is no ratification of the 
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unauthorized acts of an agent for failure to return the bene-
fits of the contract if it is impossible to return the bene-
fits. Utah has never recognized impossibility to return the 
benefits as a defense to ratification. In support of its 
position, appellant cites Newco Land Co. v. Martin. 358 Mo. 
99, 213 SW 2d 694, and Farmers State Bank v. Haun, 30 Wyo. 
322. 222 P. 45. 
Appellant refers to language in Nevco Land Co. where-
in the Court distinguished a case, (Winkleback v. National 
Exchange Bank, 155 Mo.App. 1. 136 SW 712) dealing with the 
rescission of a sale of realty that held principal's retention 
of benefits was not a ratification when "without his fault 
conditions are such that he cannot be placed in status quo or 
repudiate the transaction without loss.11 Newco Land Co. at 
510. The Court in Newco Land Co. held this principle was not 
applicable to the retention of money deposited to the account 
of the defendant therein. 
The benefit that was impossible to return in Farmers 
State Bank was a series of transactions that kept the bank 
solvent. The benefit was of the nature that it "could prob-
ably not be measured or restored. . ." Farmers State Bank at 
57. The defense claimed by appellant is limited to strict 
impossibility of the return of the benefits, for instance 
services performed by a physician. Bankers Protective Life 
Ins. Co. v. Addison. 237 SW 2d 694 (1951. Tex. lO.App.). 
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The only evidence of appellant in support of its 
claim that it was impossible to return the benefits is an 
affidavit by its officer that at the time the transaction was 
discovered: 
[t]here was no money in the corporate 
account at Zions Bank, nor in the partner-
ship account. We had recently ordered 
$50,000 in equipment which was due to be 
paid for in October. 1978 and we had on-
going expenses of over $40,000 per month. 
The doctors had to go without pay for a 
period of time. We had to give Zions Bank 
about $5,000 to close out our checking 
account. We could not give back the money 
because we didn't have it. the money had 
already gone back to Zions Bank to pay for 
overdrafts on our account. 
(Rc at 283. 84) . 
At most. the affidavit demonstrates a financial 
difficulty in repaying the promissory note but not an impos-
sibility. Clark had already had the benefit of the loan when 
it issued the $25,000.00 in checks which overdrafted the 
accounts for which the loan was made. Clark further does not 
answer how it is going to pay for the $50,000.00 of equipment 
it had ordered or the $40,000.00 monthly ongoing expenses when 
there were no funds in Clark's account. Furthermore, there is 
nothing in the record indicating that it was impossible for 
appellant to borrow elsewhere to repay the note or that appel-
lant continued to be financially unable to repay the note. 
Appellant merely attempts to avoid its legitimate obligation 
by ill-founded claims that it did not receive the benefit of 
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the promissory note or that it was financially difficult to 
repay the note. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER IN LIMINE IS NOT BEFORE THE 
COURT 
In Point II of appellant's brief, it seeks review of 
the trial court's Order in Limine limiting the issues at trial 
and the evidence that could be presented. The Order in Limine 
was an interim order entered pursuant to the power of the 
court under Rule 16, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 16 
provides the court with the continuing power to modify the 
order at any time prior to trial. 
Subsequent to the Order in Limine, the court granted 
Zions' Motion for Summary Judgment on its First Cause of 
Action. The Order in Limine never became operative because 
the action did not proceed to trial. Therefore, the Order in 
Limine is not properly before this Court for review because it 
never had any effect on the proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court granted plaintiff's Motions for 
Summary Judgment on facts not in dispute. Primarily, those 
rulings were predicated upon the defendant's Answers to 
Requests for Admission. 
Where facts not in dispute were the basis for the 
trial court's rulings, it was appropriate that the ruling on 
the Counterclaim and on plaintiff!s First Cause of Action on 
ratification of the promissory note should be decided on 
summary judgment. This Court should affirm both rulings. 
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of December. 
1984. 
M. Dayle Jeff 
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